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MR. KEYTE:  Commissioner Ohlhausen has 
agreed to give some remarks at lunch today and also 
will be a keynote speaker on Friday.  For today, there 
will be some questions at the end.  Maybe she’s 
feeling that she might have a little more freedom 
these days to say what’s on her mind.  You never know. 
As everybody knows, Commissioner Ohlhausen 
really has been holding, and has held, the Federal 
Trade Commission together during some quite 
interesting times and really, both analytically and in 
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terms of enforcement, kept the FTC on-track when they 
were down to essentially two Commissioners. 
The anecdote I have, however, which I think 
is in some sense even more interesting, is one of 
Commissioner Ohlhausen’s hobbies that I learned about 
firsthand.  When I signed up to do skeet shooting at 
one of these post-annual conferences, I thought: Okay, 
well, that’ll be fun.  You get to schmooze with the 
Commissioner.  Skeet shooting.  This should be 
interesting. 
Of course, I show up with eight other 
people.  The Commissioner has her own gun, her own 
case, her own stuff.  I’m worried about killing 
somebody.  I think Maureen proceeded to hit twenty-
three of twenty-five while the rest of us were trying 
to hit three and not kill each other. 
She’s very tough in many respects.  She may 
have — I just saw an announcement — just had a victory 
like five minutes ago —  
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  Yes. 
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MR. KEYTE:  — that she may want to talk 
about.   
We welcome you both for our practitioners’ 
lunch and for speaking on Friday as well.  Thank you. 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  Thank you, James, for that 
very nice introduction, and I hope my record in court 
is as good as my record on the skeet shooting range, 
but we’ll see. 
It’s always an honor to participate at the 
annual Fordham event where international enforcers 
from around the world share observations about their 
competition policies and their regimes. 
As many of you know, my term as an FTC 
Commissioner draws to a close at the end of this 
month.  It has been a wonderful experience, and I’m 
very proud of my tenure at the FTC, but as the saying 
goes, “All good things must come to an end.” 
Which leads me to my topic today, which is 
remedies and what we do at the end of a successful 
competition case.  I know there has been some 
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discussion this morning of what are the appropriate 
remedies, and I’ll expand a little bit on what was 
said earlier. 
There has been a lively discussion at the 
Commission recently about a host of issues, including 
remedies in both competition and consumer protection 
cases.  Thus, I believe it’s a good time for me to 
address several topics about competition remedies. 
First, I’ll talk about the purpose of 
remedies in a competition case; second, what we at the 
FTC have learned about how merger remedies are 
working; and third, how we’ve been applying that 
knowledge.  Finally, I’ll mention a recent challenge 
to our ability to get the remedy of injunctive relief 
in federal court. 
Taking on the first topic, the purpose of 
remedies in a competition case necessarily requires an 
understanding of the goals of competition law itself.  
In the United States we believe — and I think the 
courts have made clear — that the government’s role in 
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competition enforcement is to safeguard and preserve 
competition.  An important corollary to this 
fundamental principle is that it is not the role of 
antitrust to create or direct competition. 
In practice, this means that competition 
enforcers should not intervene simply because they 
dislike certain market outcomes.  Antitrust is about 
protecting the process, not guaranteeing a particular 
result at a particular time.  Instead, we trust that 
markets, in which firms must endure competitive 
pressures, will produce favorable outcomes in terms of 
price, output, quality, and innovation in the long 
run.  But if prices seem excessive or output stagnant 
at a point in time, we don’t use antitrust enforcement 
to require firms to charge less or to produce more. 
In short, antitrust is not regulation.  This 
is because, as the Supreme Court observed in the 
National Society of Professional Engineers case, 
“Competition is the best method of allocating 
resources in a free market, and even occasional 
 6 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition 
are not grounds for antitrust enforcement.” 
But this isn’t to denigrate competition 
enforcement, which plays a vital role in overall 
government efforts to provide a framework in which 
competition can thrive.  Rather, this speaks to the 
government’s appropriate task in competition 
enforcement.  As Milton Friedman described: “The 
purpose of government in a free economy is to do what 
markets cannot do.  That is, serve as an umpire, 
create money, build roads and parks.  The role of 
government is not to dictate outcomes of the market 
process.”1 
I agree with that description of our role as 
an umpire, making sure that competitors compete fairly 
on the merits.  We shouldn’t dictate outcomes, 
however, or pick the winner or loser of the game.  But 
government should make sure that the sides are not 
agreeing to shave points, prevent better players from 
                                                 
1 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM  (1962). 
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playing, or colluding to undermine the nature of the 
contest. 
If we agree, at least for now, that the role 
of antitrust enforcement is to preserve competition 
and not to create or direct it or pursue some other 
goal than consumer welfare, then we have a starting 
point from which the government can appropriately 
begin to seek remedies.  Because merger remedies are 
the most common form of competition remedies, I’ll 
start with those. 
I’ve long called for transparency and 
predictability and fairness in competition 
enforcement.  What these principles mean in the 
context of merger remedies is that the parties and the 
public should know among other things what remedies 
the FTC is likely to seek to mitigate potential harm 
to competition from a combination of particular firms. 
As this audience knows — and I think it was 
referenced earlier today — in the last few years there 
has been a robust academic debate about the efficacy 
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of merger remedies, which previous FTC chairs have 
addressed at this very conference.  In fact, the most 
recent issue of the Antitrust Law Journal includes the 
latest chapter of that discussion authored by two FTC 
economists, which I commend to all of you. 
Although I acknowledge this larger debate, 
what I’d like to talk about today is what the agency 
has been doing to address such concerns regardless of 
their actual magnitude. 
As one of my first actions as Acting 
Chairman, early last year I announced the release of 
the FTC’s 2017 Merger Remedies Report.  In building on 
the FTC’s 1999 Divestiture Study, the 2017 Report 
provides the latest insight into the efficacy of the 
Commission’s merger remedies.  In preparing this 
Report, staff reviewed all of its remedial orders 
between 2006 and 2012, eighty-nine orders in all, 
variously using a case study method, questionnaires, 
and data. 
The conclusions are heartening because they 
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suggest that the FTC’s remedies work well in most 
cases, and the conclusions were useful because they 
identify imperfections that the Commission and its 
staff have not only begun addressing but are 
implementing in reaching merger consent orders today. 
An important highlight of the Report’s 
findings is that while over 80 percent of the FTC’s 
remedies succeeded, all of the consents containing 
fix-it-first structural divestitures of ongoing 
businesses successfully maintain competition.  By 
comparison, divesting partial assets and hold-separate 
agreements were not always effective remedies.  
Sometimes the divested partial assets were not as 
competitively robust as anticipated.  When competitive 
businesses were maintained by neutral third parties 
under hold-separate agreements, those businesses 
sometimes missed opportunities that would have made 
the divested asset more competitive. 
FTC staff is already moving forward on 
improving those outcomes.  Not only are we seeking 
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more fix-it-first divestitures, but as current Bureau 
of Competition (BC) Director Bruce Hoffman explained 
recently, “Going forward, the Agency will negotiate 
consents to ensure that the risk of failure be placed 
on the parties to the merger and not the FTC.”  
Indeed, this is already evident in some recent orders. 
For example, the CRH acquisition of Ash 
Grove involved products of cement and aggregates — 
always a popular antitrust topic — such as crushed 
stone, gravel, sand, and similar products with 
operations throughout the United States.  There are 
many competitors nationwide, but distribution of these 
products tends to be regional — they are heavy 
products — and so geographic markets tend to be 
smaller. 
In this case there were potentially 
anticompetitive overlaps in Montana; Omaha, Nebraska; 
and eastern Kansas.  As one would expect, the FTC 
ordered divestitures of the complete ongoing 
businesses’ operations in these three markets to 
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competitors around the industry.  These buyers were 
ready to move into the ongoing operations quickly with 
minimal competitive disruption.  But to shift the risk 
and preserve competition in Montana the order also 
guaranteed that CRH provide the buyer of the Montana 
assets access to certain CRH rail terminals to ensure 
they would be able to compete on an equal footing with 
the incumbent and that there wouldn’t be any 
disruption in distribution. 
The 2017 Remedy Study was also useful in 
formulating the order in Grifols’s acquisition of 
Biotest.  This merger involved blood plasma collection 
centers throughout the United States and it raised 
competitive concerns in three markets.  The order 
required that the parties sell the full business 
operations in those three markets to a buyer that 
already competed in other markets.  But to maintain 
the competitive status quo better and shift the risks, 
the order also required the parties to give all 
potentially affected employees at the divested assets 
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sufficient financial incentives to stay with the 
divested assets, and this helped ensure that 
competition would be preserved in those three markets. 
The cases I’ve discussed so far have 
involved horizontal mergers.  Vertical merger 
challenges are less frequent, though certainly not 
rare, and vertical merger review is a meaningful part 
of FTC merger enforcement.  In fact, since the year 
2000 the FTC and Department of Justice have challenged 
twenty-two vertical mergers, which is about one per 
year. 
That being said, vertical merger enforcement 
is still a small part of our merger workload, and I 
think this likely reflects the overall broad consensus 
in competition policy and economic theory that the 
majority of vertical mergers are beneficial because 
they reduce costs and increase interbrand competition. 
But this doesn’t mean that all vertical 
mergers are benign, however, and we have challenged 
vertical mergers on grounds such as a reduction in the 
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likelihood of beneficial entry, anticompetitive 
foreclosure, or anticompetitive behavior due to 
information sharing about a rival.  For cases where 
the vertical merger would benefit consumers as long as 
the anticompetitive effects were mitigated, the FTC 
has successfully developed remedies to prevent harm. 
I’d like to stress that the FTC prefers 
structural remedies even with vertical mergers, but in 
some cases we believe that a behavioral or conduct 
remedy can prevent competitive harm while still 
allowing the benefits of integration to occur.  For 
example, in our experience firewalls can prevent 
information sharing, and nondiscrimination clauses can 
eliminate incentives to disfavor rivals. 
Notably, the 2017 Merger Study included four 
orders related to vertical mergers, and each one 
succeeded in maintaining competition at premerger 
levels.  Although it’s a small sample, it does suggest 
we have the expertise and experience to fashion 
conduct remedies in vertical mergers that control 
 14 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
opportunities and incentives for anticompetitive 
behavior. 
Our most recent example of a vertical merger 
remedy involved the tie-up of Northrop and Orbital 
ATK.  Defense contractor Northrop sought to acquire 
Orbital ATK, which manufactures solid rocket motors.  
There was no horizontal product overlap.  However, 
Orbital ATK sells solid rocket motors to Northrop and 
its rivals, who sell them with other products to the 
Department of Defense.  Northrop also purchases solid 
rocket motors from Orbital ATK and other competitors. 
When FTC staff investigated the merger, they 
learned that both Northrop’s and Orbital ATK’s 
competitors were concerned that the merged company 
would share competitively sensitive information about 
each other’s rivals and gain an unfair advantage in 
both markets. 
To prevent the potential competitive harm 
from arising we crafted an order requiring the parties 
to create a firewall that will prohibit Northrop and 
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Orbital ATK, those units now owned by the same 
company, from sharing data with each other.  To better 
guarantee compliance, the order also allows the 
Department of Defense to appoint a monitor to confirm 
compliance with these restrictions, and the Department 
of Defense was the real purchaser for most of these 
systems. 
Turning to conduct remedies, the debate here 
often is about how far the agency should go to restore 
market competition and deter future anticompetitive 
conduct.  That’s why it’s important — indeed critical 
— to remember that the role of the FTC is to restore 
markets to their competitive states and prevent future 
anticompetitive conduct, not to restructure markets or 
businesses to regulators’ preferences divorced from 
any underlying violation. 
A good example of a typical conduct remedy 
is the order issued in the recent Your Therapy Source 
matter.  This case involved an agreement between two 
parties and then a wider invitation to collude in the 
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home therapist staffing market in the Dallas/Fort 
Worth area. 
Home therapist staffing companies outsource 
therapist staffing to independent contractors, and the 
complaint alleged that one staffing company sought an 
agreement among competitors to place a ceiling on the 
wages paid to independent contractors.  There was 
strong evidence that the respondent made an invitation 
to collude but that except for one competitor there 
was no evidence that other recipients acted on that 
invitation. 
In cases like this, where the FTC catches 
the conduct in its incipiency, an order is still 
needed to prevent any future collusion, and thus our 
order required the parties to cease and desist from 
further inappropriate communications among 
competitors. 
The need to prevent a recurrence of 
anticompetitive conduct brings me to an issue 
involving our remedial authority.  It is currently on 
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appeal before the Third Circuit in the ViroPharma 
litigation.  Our complaint in federal court alleged 
the defendant engaged in repetitive sham petitioning 
before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
include a generic competitor to its branded product, 
and we sought to permanently enjoin ViroPharma from 
using similar methods to exclude generic competition 
in its other branded products. 
The district court dismissed the complaint 
on what it believed were novel grounds, holding that 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act allows injunctive relief 
“only if the Commission can prove that the defendant 
is imminently about to violate the FTC Act.”  Because 
ViroPharma’s efforts to forestall generic competition 
for the particular product at issue ceased when the 
FDA finally dismissed ViroPharma’s baseless petitions 
and the FDA then allowed the generics to enter, the 
district court found that ViroPharma was not about to 
violate the law, and therefore the Commission could 
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
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The imminent standard applied by the 
district court risks radically altering the 
Commission’s ability to challenge any competitive 
conduct in federal court.  Section 13(b) is, at least 
today, the primary remedial tool the Commission uses 
when it litigates a conduct matter in federal court.  
By significantly narrowing its scope, the district 
court decision risks giving serial offenders a free 
pass and creates an almost impossible timing 
requirement for the Commission. 
Speaking solely for myself, I’m hopeful that 
the Third Circuit will reverse the lower court, given 
that its decision is at odds with the standard applied 
in many other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit. 
I’ll close by reiterating that predicting 
competitive outcomes and finding the right enforcement 
remedies requires a clear understanding of the goals 
of antitrust law and careful analytical work.  Every 
market is different, and each case presents its unique 
facts.  We should, however, still strive to carry out 
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this important work in a way that provides 
predictability, transparency, and fairness to parties 
and the public. 
Thank you for your attention, and I’d be 
happy to take some questions. 
James. 
MR. KEYTE:  Maureen, in terms of remedies, 
how has the FTC dealt with international cooperation 
for multijurisdictional protection? 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  In my experience, we’ve been 
able for the most part to handle that pretty well.  
For example, a few years ago there was a music merger.  
We reviewed it in the United States, they reviewed it 
in Europe, and we found that though there were 
problems the European remedy really took care of it, 
so we were happy with that. 
Certainly that is not always the case.  
Sometimes we have seen cases where we thought a remedy 
was sufficient and other regimes around the world may 
have wanted something different.  Personally I do have 
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some concerns about extraterritorial reach of some 
remedies or some of the hold-separate agreements for 
an indeterminate amount of time, remedies that we’ve 
seen some other enforcers impose. 
But I think for many cases we really do try 
to strive to have a consistent remedy.  Going back to 
some of the cement cases, we’ve had some. I think the 
Canadian remedy and the U.S. remedy really meshed 
together quite well.  It’s for the most part working 
okay, but every once in a while. 
MR. KEYTE:  Any other questions? 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  Another question? 
[No response] 
MR. KEYTE:  All right.  Well, thank you, 
Maureen, and good luck with your judgeship, which we 
know will eventually happen. 
MS. OHLHAUSEN:  Thank you so much, everyone. 
[Break: 1:36 p.m.] 
